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Transnational	  Business	  Governance	  and	  the	  	  
Management	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  
	  
Abstract:	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  the	  international	  community	  has	  intervened	  indirectly	  to	  
reduce	   the	   conflict	   and	   corruption	   that	   accompany	   natural	   resource	   development	   in	  
weakly	  governed	  states.	  These	  efforts	  converge	  on	  the	  norm	  of	   information	  disclosure	  by	  
industry	   as	   a	   regulatory	   mechanism,	   but	   diverge	   in	   how	   this	   is	   institutionalized	   in	   a	  
number	   of	   different	   transnational	   business	   governance	   initiative.	   This	   article	   examines	  
how	  the	  successive	  failures	  of	  public	  and	  private	  efforts	  led	  to	  patterns	  of	  convergence	  and	  
divergence	   in	   the	   transnational	   governance	   of	   the	   extractive	   sector.	   The	   timing	   of	   the	  
effort,	   combined	   with	   variation	   in	   industry	   structure,	   differences	   in	   the	   targets	   of	  
information	  disclosure,	  and	  learning	  over	  time	  influence	  the	  outcome	  in	  each	  case.	  	  This	  is	  
explored	   through	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   Kimberley	   Process,	   the	   Extractive	   Industries	  
Transparency	   Initiative,	   the	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   reforms	   in	   the	   US,	   and	   recently	   adopted	   due-­‐
diligence	  standards	  by	  the	  OECD,	  the	  US,	  and	  by	  industry.	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   When	  the	  issue	  of	  “conflict	  diamonds”	  first	  emerged	  as	  a	  global	  call	  to	  action,	  the	  
international	  community—including	  the	  diamond	  industry,	  states,	  and	  NGOs—fairly	  
quickly	  agreed	  on	  a	  certification	  system	  to	  provide	  information	  to	  buyers	  about	  the	  source	  
of	  diamonds,	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  conflict	  diamonds	  out	  of	  global	  markets.i	  Around	  the	  same	  
time,	  growing	  concern	  over	  the	  “resource	  curse”	  led	  to	  a	  much	  weaker	  consensus	  on	  a	  
transparency	  regime	  requiring	  the	  publication	  of	  information	  on	  resource	  revenues,	  to	  
keep	  them	  from	  becoming	  a	  source	  of	  domestic	  corruption.	  Over	  the	  following	  decade,	  
various	  proposals	  to	  manage	  natural	  resources	  have	  included	  different	  information	  
disclosure	  mechanisms	  as	  a	  key	  element	  of	  regulation.	  	  Separate	  agendas	  on	  corruption	  and	  
conflict	  became	  linked	  based	  on	  an	  emerging	  consensus	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  
information	  transparency	  for	  improving	  the	  governance	  of	  natural	  resources.	  Despite	  this	  
normative	  convergence,	  we	  see	  significant	  divergence	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  resulting	  
institutions.	  How	  do	  we	  explain	  the	  convergence	  in	  norms,	  and	  the	  divergence	  in	  
institutional	  outcomes,	  across	  transnational	  governance	  initiatives	  for	  the	  extractive	  
sector?	  	  
	  
	   In	  this	  article,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  interaction	  among	  public	  and	  private	  governance	  
initiatives,	  and	  the	  successive	  failures	  and	  faults	  in	  different	  efforts,	  produced	  a	  common	  
acceptance	  of	  information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  regulatory	  mechanism.	  However,	  
experimentation	  over	  time	  led	  to	  variation	  in	  who,	  what	  and	  how	  information	  was	  to	  be	  
disclosed.	  This	  variation	  was	  a	  result	  of	  evolving	  relations	  among	  public	  and	  private	  
authorities	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  govern	  different	  industries	  and	  different	  targets.	  The	  
structure	  of	  industry,	  the	  goals	  of	  information	  disclosure,	  and	  learning	  from	  failures	  
influenced	  the	  character	  of	  successive	  governance	  schemes.	  	  This	  article	  compares	  the	  
Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme	  (KPCS),	  the	  Extractive	  Industry	  Transparency	  
Initiative	  (EITI),	  and	  a	  collection	  of	  recent	  supply	  chain	  “due	  diligence”	  initiatives	  by	  states	  
and	  industry	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  convergence	  of	  norms	  and	  divergence	  in	  institutional	  
outcomes.	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  governance	  initiatives	  grew	  out	  of	  international	  concern	  about	  the	  link	  
between	  natural	  resources	  and	  weak	  governance.	  All	  are	  designed	  to	  prevent	  the	  extensive	  
revenues	  from	  natural	  resource	  development	  from	  getting	  into	  the	  “wrong”	  hands,	  i.e.	  
rebels,	  paramilitaries,	  corrupt	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats.	  Corruption	  and	  conflict	  initially	  
began	  as	  separate	  international	  issue	  areas,	  with	  distinct	  networks	  of	  activism	  and	  
different	  perspectives	  on	  the	  role	  of	  business	  both	  in	  causing	  and	  in	  curing	  the	  problem.	  
Over	  time,	  issue	  entrepreneurs	  linked	  the	  agendas	  into	  a	  broader	  concern	  with	  natural	  
resource	  management	  in	  general.	  These	  agendas	  became	  entwined,	  with	  an	  underlying	  
norm	  of	  information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pursuing	  regulatory	  action	  and	  improved	  
governance.(Fung,	  Graham,	  and	  Weil	  2007)	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  meshing	  of	  agendas,	  the	  institutional	  outcomes	  have	  diverged	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  key	  dimensions	  (see	  Table	  1).	  	  First,	  they	  differ	  in	  the	  mechanism	  for	  
information	  disclosure—certification	  systems,	  public	  reporting	  of	  revenues,	  or	  auditing	  of	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supply	  chains.	  	  Second,	  they	  aim	  at	  different	  targets—international	  transactions	  (trade	  and	  
supply	  chains),	  or	  domestic	  transactions	  (weak	  governance).	  Third,	  they	  include	  different	  
actors	  in	  governance—states,	  NGOs	  and/or	  industry.	  Finally,	  they	  vary	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
initiative—covering	  a	  single	  mineral,	  an	  industry	  sector,	  or	  a	  supply	  chain.	  
	  
The	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  First,	  I	  lay	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  minerals	  
problem	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  different	  transnational	  business	  governance	  initiatives.	  I	  then	  
discuss	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  transnational	  business	  governance,	  and	  what	  it	  
says	  about	  how	  different	  initiatives	  might	  interact.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  
anti-­‐corruption	  and	  conflict	  prevention	  agendas,	  establishing	  their	  convergence	  over	  time	  
in	  the	  area	  of	  natural	  resource	  management.	  	  The	  next	  section	  compares	  the	  institutional	  
divergence	  among	  governance	  efforts	  over	  time	  through	  a	  comparison	  of	  different	  cases.	  In	  
the	  final	  section,	  I	  draw	  out	  the	  comparisons	  among	  these	  governance	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  
implications	  of	  this	  research	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  different	  transnational	  
governance	  initiatives	  interact.	  
	  
	  	  
Table	  1.	  	  Comparisons	  
	  
 KPCS EITI OECD US EICC-
GeSI 
Transactions Supply chain Internal 
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Via Trade Via State None Via State None 
	  
 




II.	  The	  Problem	  of	  Natural	  Resource	  Wealth	  
	  
The	  period	  immediately	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  not	  one	  of	  peace,	  as	  
many	  had	  hoped.	  States	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  orbit	  broke	  apart	  violently,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
Balkans.	  	  Clients	  of	  both	  the	  US	  and	  USSR	  in	  Africa	  and	  Central	  America	  were	  cut	  adrift.	  	  
Civil	  conflicts	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  especially	  Africa,	  raised	  concern	  within	  the	  
international	  community.	  Civil	  wars	  and	  state	  failures	  spiked	  upward	  in	  the	  1990s,	  with	  the	  
horrors	  of	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  child	  soldiers	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  horrific	  violence	  
elsewhere	  making	  it	  evident	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  global	  peace	  dividend—at	  least,	  not	  for	  
some.	  	  Long-­‐running	  and	  brutal	  conflicts	  in	  Angola,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Rwanda,	  the	  Democratic	  
Republic	  of	  the	  Congo,	  and	  Côte	  d’Ivoire	  spilled	  across	  national	  borders.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  
decade	  that	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  imposed	  sanctions	  numerous	  times	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  end	  
the	  violence.	  
	  	  
	   Many	  observers	  of	  the	  conflict—activists,	  scholars,	  and	  policymakers—began	  to	  
identify	  economic	  factors	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  these	  “new	  wars.”	  (Kaldor	  1999;	  Duffield	  2001;	  
Newman	  2004)	  Empirical	  and	  policy-­‐oriented	  research	  analyzed	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  
by	  which	  trade	  and	  investment	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  conflict	  by	  
creating	  conditions	  that	  sustain	  the	  continued	  use	  of	  violence.	  (Klare	  2002;	  Berdal	  and	  
Malone	  2000;	  Ballentine	  and	  Sherman	  2003;	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2004;	  Humphreys	  2005;	  
Ross	  2006;	  Humphreys,	  Sachs,	  and	  Stiglitz	  2007)	  Analysis	  of	  the	  economic	  causes	  of	  war	  
generated	  an	  extensive	  debate	  over	  “greed”	  versus	  “grievance”	  as	  factors	  explaining	  the	  
outbreak	  of	  violence.(Berdal	  and	  Malone	  2000;	  Ballentine	  and	  Sherman	  2003)	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  
“resource	  curse”	  became	  a	  focus	  of	  attention	  in	  both	  the	  academic	  and	  policy	  communities,	  
drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  correlation	  between	  countries	  that	  have	  great	  natural	  resource	  
wealth	  and	  those	  that	  suffer	  the	  most	  poverty,	  violence,	  and	  retarded	  development.	  (Karl	  
1997;	  Ross	  1999;	  deSoysa	  2000;	  Robinson,	  Torvik,	  and	  Verdier	  2006;	  Petroleum	  and	  
Poverty	  Paradox	  	  2008;	  Humphreys,	  Sachs,	  and	  Stiglitz	  2007)	  Natural	  resources,	  
particularly	  high-­‐value	  ones	  such	  as	  oil	  and	  diamonds,	  provide	  the	  financial	  wherewithal	  to	  
buy	  soldiers	  and	  weapons	  for	  war.	  They	  are	  also	  a	  source	  of	  competition	  among	  elites	  to	  
control	  and	  appropriate	  resource	  revenues,	  fostering	  corruption	  and	  undermining	  good	  
governance.	  (Humphreys	  2005)	  Weak	  governance	  itself	  is	  the	  primary	  problem,	  and	  
resource	  wealth	  simply	  exacerbates	  it.	  (Lederman	  and	  Maloney	  2008;	  Lujala,	  Gleditsch,	  and	  
Gilmore	  2005;	  Fearon	  2005;	  Luong	  and	  Weinthal	  2006)	  	  
	  	  
	   It	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  rising	  concern	  over	  how	  economic	  factors	  fed	  into	  
conflict	  that	  activists	  and	  policymakers	  began	  to	  consider	  ways	  to	  regulate	  high-­‐value	  
resources	  as	  a	  means	  to	  end	  war	  and	  mitigate	  corruption.	  Two	  different	  broad	  approaches	  
have	  been	  applied:	  targeted	  sanctions	  applied	  to	  commodities	  and	  finance;	  and	  the	  
transnational	  governance	  initiatives	  analyzed	  here.	  The	  former	  are	  a	  variation	  on	  
traditional	  sanctions,	  and	  evolved	  largely	  out	  of	  disappointment	  with	  the	  utility	  and	  
humanity	  of	  comprehensive	  UN	  multilateral	  sanctions.	  The	  failure	  of	  these	  “smart”	  
sanctions	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  experimentation	  with	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transnational	  business	  governance.	  
	  
	   From	  1994	  to	  the	  present	  time,	  the	  United	  Nations	  applied	  sanctions	  to	  diamonds,	  
oil,	  and	  timber	  in	  Angola,	  Liberia,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  and	  Côte	  
d’Ivoire.	  While	  targeted	  sanctions	  had	  better	  humanitarian	  outcomes	  than	  comprehensive	  
sanctions	  would	  have	  produced,	  they	  did	  relatively	  little	  to	  stem	  the	  violence.	  In	  1998,	  the	  
UN	  commissioned	  a	  High	  Level	  Expert	  Group	  to	  investigate	  sanctions-­‐busting	  among	  states	  
and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  The	  resulting	  report	  (called	  the	  “Fowler	  Report”	  after	  its	  lead	  author),	  
was	  a	  devastating	  indictment	  of	  the	  sanctions	  regime.	  (Fowler	  2000)	  It	  was	  in	  the	  
aftermath	  of	  this	  report,	  and	  the	  evidence	  that	  traditional	  methods	  were	  not	  working,	  that	  
both	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  sought	  alternatives.	  Within	  the	  next	  decade,	  a	  variety	  of	  
stakeholders	  participated	  in	  creating	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  for	  the	  Certification	  of	  	  Rough	  
Diamonds	  (KPCS);	  the	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  (EITI);	  the	  U.S.	  Dodd-­‐
Frank	  conflict	  minerals	  provisions;	  the	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  standards;	  the	  Global	  
eSustainability	  Initiative;	  the	  Voluntary	  Principles	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Security;	  the	  Chad-­‐
Cameroon	  Pipeline	  Project;	  and	  various	  other	  resource	  management	  efforts.ii	  All	  of	  these	  
governance	  initiatives	  seek	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  conflict,	  corruption	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  
governance	  by	  regulating	  the	  extractive	  sector.	  However,	  each	  one	  varies	  in	  some	  crucial	  
manner,	  i.e.	  the	  particular	  segment	  of	  the	  extractive	  sector	  to	  be	  regulated,	  international	  
versus	  domestic	  transactions,	  or	  the	  particular	  mechanisms	  and	  actors	  involved	  in	  
governance.	  
	  
III.	  Transnational	  Business	  Governance	  Interactions	  
 
How	  do	  we	  ensure	  that	  transnational	  business	  is	  governed	  appropriately	  as	  it	  
expands	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  any	  one	  sovereign	  authority?	  Traditionally,	  scholarship	  
and	  policymaking	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  cooperate	  in	  establishing	  an	  
international	  legal	  framework	  for	  economic	  activity.	  In	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  international	  
relations	  theorists	  developed	  theories	  of	  cooperation,	  regimes,	  and	  institutions	  to	  explain	  
successes	  and	  failures	  in	  regulation,	  focusing	  only	  on	  state	  behavior.	  (Keohane	  1984;	  
Krasner	  1983)	  In	  recent	  years,	  however,	  attention	  has	  turned	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  global	  
governance	  that	  complement	  or	  compete	  with	  traditional	  forms	  of	  authority	  (Avant,	  
Finnemore,	  and	  Sell	  2010;	  Hall	  and	  Biersteker	  2002;	  Hewson	  and	  Sinclair	  1999;	  Hoffman	  
and	  Ba	  2005;	  Reinicke,	  Benner,	  and	  Witte	  2003)	  These	  primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  transnational	  
regulation	  of	  business	  entities.	  
	  
These	  new	  forms	  have	  been	  characterized	  as	  “private	  authority”	  (Hall	  and	  
Biersteker	  2002;	  Buthe	  2004;	  Vogel	  2009);	  “multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance,”	  (Hallstrom	  
and	  Bostrom	  2010)	  “global	  public-­‐policy	  networks,”	  (Reinicke,	  Benner,	  and	  Witte	  2003)	  
“private	  or	  industry	  self-­‐regulation,”	  (Vogel	  2009;	  Haufler	  2001)	  “regulatory	  standard-­‐
setting	  systems,”	  (Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  2009)	  and	  “transnational	  business	  governance.”	  (this	  
issue)	  These	  and	  other	  labels	  refer	  to	  the	  significant	  growth	  and	  evolution	  of	  regulatory	  
standard	  setting	  efforts	  that	  are	  either	  completely	  or	  partly	  established	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	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often	  include	  the	  businesses	  to	  be	  regulated,	  are	  voluntarily	  adopted,	  and	  are	  transnational	  
in	  scope.	  They	  may	  be	  market-­‐driven,	  such	  as	  international	  certification	  systems	  that	  label	  
products	  according	  to	  environmental	  or	  other	  standards.	  (Cashore,	  Auld,	  and	  Newsom	  
2004)	  Others	  are	  socially-­‐driven	  systems	  that	  establish	  principles,	  rules	  and	  norms	  for	  
corporate	  behavior	  instead	  of	  for	  products,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  human	  rights	  standards	  for	  
business.	  Many	  contain	  some	  mix	  of	  these	  features.	  States	  are	  not	  absent	  from	  these	  new	  
forms	  of	  global	  governance,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  always	  the	  central	  authority.	  (Avant,	  
Finnemore,	  and	  Sell	  2010)	  
	  
These	  systems	  of	  governance	  have	  grown	  in	  number	  and	  significance,	  and	  they	  
increasingly	  overlap	  and	  interact	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  know	  very	  little	  about.	  (Eberlein	  et	  al,	  
Introduction)	  We	  see	  this	  most	  clearly	  in	  environmental	  standard-­‐setting,	  where	  
certification	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  Forest	  Stewardship	  Council	  vie	  with	  the	  Sustainable	  
Forestry	  Initiative	  for	  the	  allegiance	  of	  producers	  and	  consumers	  (Bartley,	  Cashore	  and	  
Stone,	  Overdevest	  and	  Zeitlin,	  and	  Gulbrandsen	  in	  this	  special	  issue(Cashore,	  Auld,	  and	  
Newsom	  2004;	  Meidinger	  2006).	  But	  such	  initiatives	  have	  emerged	  across	  a	  much	  wider	  
array	  of	  problems—labor	  (O'Rourke	  2003),	  finance	  (Porter,	  this	  issue),	  information	  
technology	  (Tully	  2004;	  Mueller	  2002),	  and	  others.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
approaches	  we	  might	  employ	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  different	  systems	  might	  interact	  
within	  a	  particular	  issue	  area.	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  approaches	  focuses	  on	  market	  competition	  as	  the	  main	  
form	  of	  interaction.	  	  For	  instance,	  strong	  forest	  sustainability	  initiatives	  compete	  with	  weak	  
ones,	  independently	  monitored	  labor	  codes	  compete	  with	  self-­‐monitoring	  ones,	  as	  each	  one	  
seeks	  to	  obtain	  the	  support	  of	  producers	  and	  consumers.	  (Cashore,	  Auld,	  and	  Newsom	  
2004)	  Cashore,	  et	  al	  have	  done	  the	  most	  to	  develop	  this	  idea,	  proposing	  a	  category	  of	  
regulatory	  systems	  they	  label	  “non-­‐state	  market	  driven	  (NMSD).”	  But	  this	  competitive	  
approach	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  element	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Prakash	  and	  others,	  who	  use	  “club	  
theory”	  to	  frame	  the	  emergence	  of	  transnational	  business	  governance.	  (Prakash	  and	  
Potoski	  2010)	  These	  provide	  insights	  into	  situations	  where	  more	  than	  one	  governance	  
initiative	  is	  essentially	  seeking	  the	  same	  goal,	  i.e.	  certification	  schemes	  compete	  to	  enroll	  
participants	  and	  attract	  consumers	  through	  the	  standards	  they	  negotiate	  and	  the	  
legitimacy	  they	  seek	  to	  establish.	  (Koppell	  2010)	  This	  literature	  explains	  why	  and	  how	  
competition	  can	  lead	  schemes	  to	  converge	  or	  diverge	  in	  their	  rules,	  standards,	  and	  
enforcement	  mechanisms.	  However,	  they	  are	  less	  helpful	  in	  explaining	  situations	  where	  the	  
overarching	  social	  goal	  is	  the	  same	  in	  different	  schemes,	  but	  they	  operate	  in	  different	  
markets	  or	  industry	  segments.	  Competition	  is	  not	  the	  main	  form	  of	  interaction.	  
	  
A	  more	  relational	  approach	  to	  interaction	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  theories	  of	  hierarchy,	  
delegation,	  collaboration	  and	  orchestration.	  Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  have	  surveyed	  these	  
alternatives,	  focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  and	  private	  
authority.	  (Abbott	  and	  Snidal	  2011)	  Both	  hierarchy	  and	  delegation	  assume	  that	  different	  
authorities	  have	  conflicting	  interests,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  not	  operating	  completely	  
independently	  of	  each	  other.	  Hierarchy	  and	  delegation	  involve	  ordered	  relationships	  
between	  authorities,	  with	  an	  identifiable	  superior.	  (Hawkins	  2006)	  Collaboration	  and	  
orchestration	  assume	  more	  congruence	  between	  interests,	  and	  describe	  relationships	  that	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are	  more	  equal.	  These	  models	  apply	  to	  distinct	  governance	  schemes	  that	  establish	  a	  
division	  of	  responsibility	  between	  them,	  instead	  of	  competing	  to	  do	  the	  same	  job.	  The	  
problem	  is	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  interaction	  within	  a	  particular	  issue	  area	  or	  industry	  sector	  
of	  multiple	  schemes	  that	  are	  not	  attempting	  to	  do	  the	  same	  job,	  but	  that	  overlap	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  overarching	  goals.	  
	  
A	  further	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  interactions	  among	  governance	  schemes	  is	  to	  think	  
of	  each	  one	  as	  only	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  larger	  whole.	  Avant,	  et	  al	  argue	  that	  global	  governance	  can	  
be	  disaggregated	  into	  different	  steps—agenda-­‐setting,	  negotiating	  rules,	  implementing	  
them,	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement,	  and	  adjudication.	  (Avant,	  Finnemore,	  and	  Sell	  2010)	  
Each	  step	  in	  this	  process,	  or	  a	  cluster	  of	  steps,	  may	  be	  undertaken	  by	  different	  sets	  of	  actors	  
through	  different	  transnational	  governance	  initiatives,	  as	  Eberlein	  et	  al	  describe.	  (Eberlein	  
et	  al	  2012)	  A	  set	  of	  advocacy	  organizations	  and	  states	  may	  put	  an	  issue	  on	  the	  international	  
agenda,	  for	  instance,	  and	  a	  mix	  of	  different	  stakeholders	  may	  negotiate	  the	  rules.	  Industry	  
may	  implement	  those	  rules,	  perhaps	  in	  concert	  with	  international	  organizations.	  
Monitoring	  may	  be	  handled	  by	  activist	  organizations,	  while	  adjudication	  may	  occur	  
through	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process.	  Each	  set	  of	  actors	  may	  be	  in	  a	  different	  type	  of	  
relationship	  with	  others,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  characterize	  the	  governance	  system	  as	  a	  
whole.	  
	  
This	  messy	  picture	  is	  what	  recent	  work	  on	  regime	  complexes	  seeks	  to	  explore.	  It	  
tends	  to	  be	  state-­‐centric,	  but	  has	  relevance	  to	  understanding	  the	  interactions	  among	  
governance	  initiatives	  of	  all	  sorts.	  Raustiala	  put	  forth	  the	  concept	  to	  describe	  systems	  of	  
overlapping	  and	  non-­‐hierarchical	  regimes	  in	  an	  area.(Raustiala	  and	  Victor	  2004)	  Keohane	  
and	  Victor	  analyze	  state	  efforts	  to	  deal	  with	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  regime	  complex,	  in	  which	  
efforts	  to	  construct	  a	  single	  comprehensive	  regime	  have	  not	  proven	  successful.	  They	  
explain	  the	  multiple	  overlapping	  regimes	  as	  a	  consequence	  in	  part	  of	  the	  multitude	  of	  
problems	  within	  that	  issue	  area,	  and	  strategic	  behavior	  among	  states,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  
diversity	  of	  institutional	  responses.	  (Keohane	  and	  Victor	  2011)	  The	  interaction	  among	  the	  
elements	  of	  the	  regime	  complex	  is	  characterized	  by	  path	  dependence	  between	  earlier	  and	  
later	  regimes;	  forum-­‐shopping	  by	  participants	  seeking	  the	  best	  venue	  to	  achieve	  their	  
interests;	  legal	  inconsistencies	  between	  regimes;	  and	  efforts	  by	  states	  to	  overcome	  these	  
inconsistencies	  through	  broad	  implementation	  and	  interpretation.	  (Raustiala	  and	  Victor	  
2004)	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  a	  regime	  complex	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  international	  version	  of	  the	  
sociological	  concept	  of	  an	  “organizational	  field.”	  	  This	  concept,	  however,	  emphasizes	  
commonalities	  and	  homogenization,	  while	  the	  regime	  complex	  literature	  emphasizes	  
competing	  interests.	  Nevertheless,	  both	  are	  approaches	  to	  analyzing	  an	  issue	  area,	  and	  
both	  look	  at	  how	  disparate	  elements	  become	  a	  common	  field.iii	  Sociological	  institutionalism	  
tells	  us	  that	  when	  an	  organizational	  field	  emerges	  there	  will	  be	  pressures	  towards	  
homogenization	  even	  in	  areas	  without	  market	  competition.	  An	  organizational	  field	  is	  
“those	  organizations	  that,	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  constitute	  a	  recognized	  area	  of	  institutional	  life:	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key	  suppliers,	  resource	  and	  product	  consumers,	  regulatory	  agencies,	  and	  other	  
organizations	  that	  produce	  similar	  services	  or	  products.”	  (DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  1983,	  148)	  
Coercion,	  common	  norms,	  and	  modeling	  behavior	  (mimesis)	  push	  managers	  to	  adopt	  
similar	  organizational	  models.	  (DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  1983)	  In	  highly	  structured	  
organizational	  fields	  the	  pressure	  towards	  convergence	  will	  be	  high.	  The	  organizations	  are	  
both	  connected	  and	  equivalent;	  they	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  but	  also	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  
networks,	  which	  evolve	  over	  time.	  (Bartley	  and	  Smith	  2008)	  The	  field	  is	  “structured”	  
through	  a	  process	  that	  involves	  increased	  interaction	  among	  organizations,	  and	  rising	  
awareness	  of	  similar	  goals.	  Weakly	  structured	  fields	  will	  experience	  fewer	  pressures	  
towards	  convergence.	  As	  Beckert	  notes,	  however,	  more	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  
convergence,	  homogenization,	  and	  diffusion	  than	  to	  divergence,	  differentiation	  and	  unique	  
trajectories	  in	  this	  literature.	  (Beckert	  2010)	  
	  
The	  transnational	  governance	  of	  natural	  resources	  has	  some	  characteristics	  of	  a	  
regime	  complex	  or	  organizational	  field,	  given	  the	  diverse	  collection	  of	  governance	  
initiatives	  that	  has	  emerged.	  Unlike	  the	  climate	  change	  case,	  however,	  there	  has	  never	  been	  
an	  effort	  to	  negotiate	  a	  single	  comprehensive	  regime,	  perhaps	  because	  it	  has	  never	  before	  
been	  viewed	  as	  a	  single	  problem	  area.	  It	  is	  a	  loosely	  structured	  field,	  which	  may	  explain	  the	  
divergence	  in	  institutional	  outcomes	  yet	  pressure	  towards	  similar	  norms.	  As	  an	  emerging	  
organizational	  field,	  path	  dependence	  may	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  interactions	  of	  
each	  successive	  governance	  effort,	  since	  the	  interactions	  take	  place	  over	  time.	  Earlier	  
efforts	  are	  both	  a	  model	  for	  and	  a	  constraint	  upon	  later	  initiatives.	  The	  natural	  resource	  
sector	  itself	  is	  of	  course	  not	  one	  single	  sector,	  but	  a	  set	  of	  different	  industries	  and	  supply	  
chains,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  characteristics.	  This	  combination	  may	  explain	  the	  divergence	  in	  
institutional	  forms.	  
	  
Drawing	  selectively	  upon	  this	  literature,	  I	  make	  two	  general	  arguments	  about	  the	  
convergence	  in	  norms	  and	  divergence	  in	  institutional	  form	  for	  natural	  resources.	  The	  first	  
has	  to	  do	  with	  timing	  and	  sequence.	  	  Early	  schemes	  institutionalized	  the	  idea	  of	  
information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  governance	  mechanism,	  which	  constrained	  the	  range	  of	  options	  
considered	  later.	  Transnational	  activism	  around	  the	  resource	  curse	  reinforced	  this	  path,	  as	  
the	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  conflict	  prevention	  campaigns	  separately	  reinforced	  the	  push	  for	  
information	  disclosure.	  These	  helped	  structure	  or	  constitute	  the	  emerging	  organizational	  
field	  of	  transnational	  resource	  management.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  argument	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  interaction	  among	  schemes.	  Early	  failures	  
mobilized	  a	  growing	  alliance	  of	  transnational	  activists,	  international	  organizations,	  
industry	  and	  states	  that	  sought	  to	  address	  gaps	  in	  coverage.	  The	  participants	  experimented	  
with	  different	  institutional	  models	  in	  order	  to	  address	  different	  targets	  and	  respond	  to	  
variations	  in	  industry	  structure—but	  they	  experimented	  within	  a	  narrow	  range,	  changing	  
targets	  and	  goals	  but	  consistently	  focusing	  on	  information	  disclosure	  mechanisms.	  Both	  
time	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  problem	  are	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  the	  interactions	  within	  
this	  loosely	  constructed	  organizational	  field.	  (Mahoney	  2000)	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The	  agenda	  for	  fighting	  international	  corruption,	  and	  the	  one	  for	  cutting	  the	  link	  
between	  conflict	  and	  natural	  resources,	  each	  emerged	  out	  of	  separate	  campaigns,	  
investigations,	  and	  lobbying	  efforts.	  As	  they	  merged,	  they	  have	  become	  a	  new	  field	  of	  action	  
and	  inquiry	  through	  interaction	  and	  engagement	  with	  each	  other.(Bartley	  and	  Smith	  2008)	  
They	  share	  common	  norms	  regarding	  the	  importance	  of	  transparency	  and	  information	  
disclosure	  as	  a	  governance	  mechanism.	  The	  turn	  towards	  transnational	  business	  
governance	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  common	  problems	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  repeated	  failure	  of	  
traditional	  international	  solutions,	  specifically,	  international	  peacekeeping	  and	  sanctions.	  
	  
	   In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  conflicts	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  
in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  became	  particularly	  brutal	  and	  intractable.	  Peacekeeping	  efforts	  and	  
the	  imposition	  of	  sanctions	  became	  more	  common,	  with	  mixed	  success.	  (Finnemore	  2003)	  
Humanitarian	  intervention	  became	  much	  more	  common,	  and	  the	  pressures	  for	  the	  
international	  community	  to	  respond	  to	  civil	  war	  became	  more	  acute.	  (Barnett	  and	  Snyder	  
2009;	  Barnett	  and	  Weiss	  2008)	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  rebels	  and	  governments	  increasingly	  
used	  the	  exploitation	  and	  sale	  of	  natural	  resources	  to	  finance	  war	  and	  violence,	  as	  the	  
patronage	  of	  Cold	  War	  competitors	  disappeared.	  The	  “resource	  curse”	  and	  “state	  failure”	  
became	  more	  common	  as	  subjects	  of	  inquiry	  in	  scholarship	  and	  policymaking.	  	  Activist	  
NGOs	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  commodities	  such	  as	  oil,	  diamonds,	  and	  timber	  in	  financing	  
long-­‐running	  conflicts.	  (Global	  Witness	  1998,	  1999;	  Smillie,	  Gberie,	  and	  Hazleton	  2000)	  
Numerous	  meetings,	  conferences	  and	  workshops	  began	  to	  create	  a	  network	  of	  people	  
focused	  on	  how	  natural	  resource	  development	  was	  managed	  by	  both	  host	  governments	  
and	  industry.	  
	  
Corruption,	  often	  tied	  to	  resource	  wealth,	  did	  not	  at	  first	  generate	  much	  policy	  
attention.	  The	  US	  had	  passed	  the	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  Act	  in	  1977,	  amended	  in	  1988,	  
with	  little	  support	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.(Weiss	  2009)	  But	  a	  handful	  of	  years	  after	  the	  
fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  in	  1993,	  Peter	  Eigen	  launched	  the	  NGO	  Transparency	  International	  
to	  pursue	  a	  transnational	  campaign	  against	  corruption—the	  “abuse	  of	  entrusted	  power	  for	  
private	  gain,”	  as	  it	  states	  on	  its	  website.	  (www.transparency.org)	  It	  established	  national	  
branches	  throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  pushed	  for	  changes	  in	  law	  and	  policies	  at	  the	  global,	  
regional,	  and	  local	  levels.	  (Waddell	  and	  Khagram	  2007)	  Each	  year,	  it	  publishes	  a	  Corruption	  
Perceptions	  Index	  which	  ranks	  countries	  by	  how	  corrupt	  they	  are	  perceived	  to	  be.	  	  And,	  as	  
its	  name	  proclaims,	  the	  organization	  promotes	  transparency	  as	  the	  main	  mechanism	  to	  
stamp	  out	  corruption.	  (Galtung	  and	  Pope	  1999)	  In	  1995,	  with	  some	  controversy,	  the	  World	  
Bank	  joined	  this	  campaign	  and	  launched	  its	  own	  efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption	  and	  facilitate	  
“good	  governance”	  in	  the	  developing	  world.iv	  Two	  years	  later,	  member	  states	  negotiated	  
the	  OECD	  Convention	  on	  Combating	  Bribery	  of	  Foreign	  Public	  Officials	  in	  International	  
Business	  Transactions,	  which	  some	  heralded	  as	  the	  impetus	  to	  changes	  in	  attitudes	  
towards	  corruption	  worldwide.	  (Brown	  and	  Cloke	  2004;	  McCoy	  2001;	  George,	  Lacey,	  and	  
Birmele	  2000)	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  norms	  about	  corruption	  had	  changed	  in	  
significant	  ways.	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Fighting	  the	  resource	  curse	  quickly	  became	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign.	  
The	  Open	  Society	  Institute,	  founded	  by	  George	  Soros	  in	  1993	  to	  support	  democracy	  and	  a	  
free	  media,	  established	  a	  special	  program	  called	  Revenue	  Watch	  in	  2002	  to	  investigate	  and	  
monitor	  the	  flow	  of	  funds	  from	  oil	  companies	  to	  governments	  in	  the	  Caspian	  region.	  Its	  goal	  
was	  “To	  help	  ensure	  that	  existing	  and	  future	  oil	  and	  natural	  resource	  funds	  in	  the	  region	  be	  
invested	  and	  expended	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public	  through	  transparency,	  civic	  
involvement,	  and	  government	  accountability.”	  (www.eurasianet.org)v	  At	  around	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  Publish	  What	  you	  Pay	  Campaign	  was	  launched	  by	  a	  handful	  of	  London	  NGOs	  to	  
press	  for	  more	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  the	  oil,	  gas	  and	  mining	  sectors.	  Within	  
six	  years,	  it	  had	  grown	  to	  include	  over	  350	  organizations—international	  and	  local,	  secular	  
and	  faith-­‐based.	  (van	  Oranje	  and	  Parham	  2009)	  Within	  the	  space	  of	  a	  decade,	  both	  the	  
official	  and	  activist	  worlds	  had	  established	  a	  core	  agenda	  that	  included	  anti-­‐corruption	  
norms,	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  mechanisms,	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  extractive	  sector.	  	  
It	  was	  in	  this	  same	  time	  period	  that	  the	  business	  and	  conflict	  agenda	  emerged,	  with	  
a	  somewhat	  later	  start.	  The	  concern	  over	  how	  natural	  resources	  finance	  conflict	  began	  very	  
quickly	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  leading	  to	  UN	  sanctions	  in	  some	  cases.	  But	  we	  can	  
date	  the	  business	  and	  conflict	  agenda	  to	  the	  initial	  outcry	  against	  “conflict	  diamonds”—
rough	  diamonds	  from	  regions	  of	  conflict,	  whose	  sale	  financed	  bloodshed	  in	  Angola	  and	  
Sierra	  Leone.	  Global	  Witness,	  launched	  in	  1993,	  issued	  ground-­‐breaking	  reports	  in	  1998	  
and	  1999	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  oil	  and	  diamonds,	  and	  Ian	  Smillie	  investigated	  rough	  
diamonds	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.(Global	  Witness	  1998,	  1999;	  Smillie,	  Gberie,	  and	  Hazleton	  2000)	  
Other	  groups	  joined	  the	  transnational	  campaign	  against	  “blood	  diamonds,”	  threatening	  the	  
brand	  and	  reputation	  of	  the	  diamond	  industry.	  Other	  natural	  resources	  also	  came	  in	  for	  
attention—timber,	  oil,	  and	  other	  minerals.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  broader	  concerns	  about	  
transparency	  and	  accountability	  throughout	  the	  extractive	  sector	  emerged.	  	  
The	  year	  2000	  marks	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  corruption	  and	  conflict	  agendas.	  	  Some	  
NGOs	  began	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  business	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  peace	  because	  it	  benefits	  
commerce,	  and	  therefore	  should	  become	  more	  engaged	  in	  conflict	  prevention.	  (Nelson	  
2000)	  This	  was	  the	  year	  Secretary-­‐General	  Kofi	  Annan	  launched	  the	  United	  Nations	  Global	  
Compact;	  one	  of	  its	  first	  activities	  was	  a	  Policy	  Dialogue	  on	  Business	  in	  Zones	  of	  Conflict.	  
The	  participants,	  drawn	  from	  industry,	  government,	  three	  UN	  agencies,	  and	  NGOs,	  quickly	  
focused	  on	  transparency	  as	  a	  core	  issue,	  which	  intersected	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  campaign.	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  would	  add	  anti-­‐corruption	  
as	  its	  tenth	  Principle.vi	  	  That	  same	  year,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  a	  resolution	  
supporting	  the	  certification	  of	  “clean”	  rough	  diamonds	  from	  conflict-­‐free	  regions.	  By	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  year,	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  diamond	  producers,	  consumers	  and	  activists	  met	  
Kimberley,	  South	  Africa	  to	  discuss	  how	  to	  establish	  a	  certification	  regime.	  	  
From	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century—a	  relatively	  short	  span	  of	  
time	  in	  international	  relations	  history—we	  see	  the	  emergence	  onto	  the	  international	  
agenda	  of	  corruption	  and	  civil	  conflict.	  Both	  converged	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  natural	  
resources	  as	  a	  particular	  problem	  that	  required	  international	  action,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  
transparency	  as	  a	  means	  to	  resolve	  it.	  Despite	  their	  commonalities,	  however,	  different	  
kinds	  of	  institutions	  were	  established	  over	  the	  next	  decade.	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V.	  	  Institutional	  Divergence	  2000-­‐2012	  	  
By	  2000,	  information	  disclosure	  had	  become	  a	  common	  touchstone	  in	  all	  proposals	  
that	  focused	  on	  natural	  resources	  as	  a	  source	  of	  conflict	  and	  corruption.	  In	  the	  decade	  to	  
follow,	  we	  see	  a	  slow	  build-­‐up	  of	  different	  transnational	  business	  governance	  initiatives.	  	  
The	  first	  one—the	  Kimberley	  Process—began	  with	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  negotiation	  that	  
covered	  the	  entire	  diamond	  industry	  and	  all	  the	  major	  players.	  Each	  succeeding	  initiative	  
both	  built	  upon	  and	  differed	  in	  significant	  ways	  from	  the	  others.	  All	  entailed	  some	  form	  of	  
information	  disclosure—certification,	  reporting,	  and/	  or	  auditing.	  These	  include	  the	  
Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative,	  the	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  Guidance,	  the	  US	  
Dodd-­‐Frank	  provisions	  on	  the	  extractive	  sector,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  recent	  supply	  chain	  tracing	  
and	  tracking	  initiatives	  that	  are	  only	  currently	  being	  developed,	  primarily	  by	  the	  Global	  
eSustainability	  Initiative	  (GeSI).	  
The	  Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme	  (KPCS)	  
	   The	  “sanctions	  decade”	  of	  the	  1990s	  came	  to	  a	  close	  with	  increasing	  evidence	  that	  
selective	  or	  “smart”	  sanctions	  had	  failed.	  These	  included	  sanctions	  on	  specific	  minerals,	  
timber	  and	  oil	  that	  were	  identified	  with	  conflicts.	  The	  UN	  established	  a	  panel	  of	  experts	  to	  
review	  the	  sanctions	  experience	  in	  Angola,	  which	  reported	  in	  detail	  the	  shameful	  level	  of	  
sanctions-­‐busting	  by	  individuals,	  firms,	  and	  governments.(Fowler	  2000)	  By	  1998,	  the	  UN	  
Security	  Council	  began	  experimenting	  with	  having	  governments	  certify	  that	  diamond	  
exports	  were	  from	  conflict-­‐free	  zones.	  However,	  there	  was	  rising	  impatience	  with	  
traditional	  measures	  to	  end	  conflict,	  and	  horror	  at	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  cruelty	  
of	  rebel	  practices	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  ongoing	  bloodshed	  generated	  media	  attention	  and	  galvanized	  activism	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  victims.	  Global	  Witness	  published	  widely	  noted	  investigative	  reports	  in	  1998	  
and	  1999	  that	  put	  companies	  on	  a	  par	  with	  governments	  in	  facilitating	  the	  ongoing	  conflict	  
in	  Angola,	  focusing	  especially	  on	  oil	  companies	  and	  banks.	  Other	  activists	  and	  NGOs	  began	  
to	  identify	  rough	  diamonds	  as	  a	  major	  source	  of	  war	  finance.	  The	  idea	  of	  “conflict	  
diamonds”	  entered	  political	  debates,	  propelled	  in	  part	  by	  highly	  effective	  campaigns	  by	  a	  
coalition	  of	  advocacy	  organizations	  targeting	  consumer	  sentiment	  by	  re-­‐labeling	  them	  
“blood	  diamonds.”	  In	  the	  space	  of	  only	  a	  few	  years,	  the	  debate	  over	  how	  to	  resolve	  conflict	  
began	  to	  shift	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  governments	  to	  increasing	  concern	  over	  the	  role	  of	  
industry—particularly	  the	  extractive	  sector.	  
	  
In	  2000,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  passed	  unanimously	  a	  resolution	  condemning	  the	  
role	  of	  diamonds	  in	  financing	  conflict	  and	  supporting	  the	  institution	  of	  a	  global	  certification	  
regime.	  The	  UN	  defines	  conflict	  diamonds	  as	  “diamonds	  that	  originate	  from	  areas	  
controlled	  by	  forces	  or	  factions	  opposed	  to	  legitimate	  and	  internationally	  recognized	  
governments,	  and	  are	  used	  to	  fund	  military	  action	  in	  opposition	  to	  those	  governments,	  or	  
in	  contravention	  of	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.”	  
(http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html	  )	  The	  UN	  focused	  its	  attention	  initially	  on	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Sierra	  Leone,	  Angola,	  and	  Liberia.	  The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  had	  already	  applied	  sanctions	  
against	  the	  UNITA	  rebels	  in	  Angola,	  including	  an	  embargo	  on	  trade	  in	  diamonds	  in	  1998	  
(and	  oil	  in	  1999),	  but	  the	  evident	  failure	  of	  these	  sanctions—which	  did	  nothing	  to	  stem	  the	  
flow	  of	  commodities	  or	  to	  bring	  the	  warring	  parties	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table—helped	  spur	  
the	  blood	  diamond	  campaign.	  The	  Kimberley	  Process	  was	  born	  out	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  UN	  
sanctions.	  
	  
	   The	  diamond	  industry,	  including	  DeBeers,	  initially	  tried	  to	  ignore	  the	  campaign	  
against	  conflict	  diamonds.	  	  But	  this	  was	  a	  challenging	  time	  for	  DeBeers.,	  which	  faced	  
increased	  difficulty	  in	  maintaining	  its	  control	  over	  the	  market.	  Conflict	  diamonds	  in	  Africa	  
were	  flooding	  the	  market,	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  led	  to	  “leakage”	  of	  diamonds	  
outside	  of	  DeBeers’	  control.	  New	  producers	  were	  entering	  the	  market,	  and	  Africa	  was	  no	  
longer	  the	  central	  source	  of	  rough	  diamonds.	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  producers,	  both	  in	  the	  industry	  and	  in	  exporting	  states,	  began	  to	  be	  more	  
concerned	  about	  the	  conflict	  diamond	  campaign.	  They	  were	  tired	  of	  the	  sanctions,	  and	  
feared	  stronger	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  market.	  To	  some	  degree	  they	  also	  worried	  
about	  consumer	  response	  to	  the	  campaign,	  and	  the	  harm	  it	  was	  doing	  to	  the	  image	  of	  
diamonds.	  As	  a	  response,	  the	  diamond	  industry	  itself	  proposed	  a	  voluntary	  system	  to	  
identify	  rough	  diamonds	  from	  conflict	  zones,	  and	  certify	  them	  as	  “conflict	  free.”	  Producer	  
states,	  such	  as	  South	  Africa	  and	  Botswana,	  sponsored	  negotiations	  in	  Kimberley,	  South	  
Africa	  in	  2000	  among	  industry	  representatives,	  diamond	  producing	  states,	  and	  two	  of	  the	  
NGOs	  most	  active	  in	  the	  campaign-­‐-­‐Global	  Witness	  and	  Partnership	  Africa	  Canada.	  Their	  
goal	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  global	  certification	  system.	  The	  World	  Federation	  of	  Diamond	  
Bourses	  and	  the	  International	  Diamond	  Manufacturers	  Association	  afterwards	  created	  the	  
World	  Diamond	  Council	  (WDC),	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  develop	  a	  tracking	  system	  for	  the	  export	  
and	  import	  of	  rough	  diamonds.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  a	  
resolution	  supporting	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  diamond	  certification	  system.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  KPCS,	  rough	  diamonds	  (diamonds	  that	  are	  uncut	  or	  minimally	  cut	  and	  
unpolished)	  would	  be	  packaged	  together	  in	  a	  parcel	  with	  a	  forgery	  resistant	  certificate	  that	  
documents	  that	  the	  stones	  do	  not	  come	  from	  designated	  conflict	  zones—i.e.	  rebel-­‐held	  or	  
contested	  territory.	  All	  member	  states	  are	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  exports	  and	  imports	  of	  
diamonds	  are	  in	  sealed	  containers,	  properly	  certified,	  and	  do	  not	  come	  from	  non-­‐
participant	  states.	  	  The	  industry	  would	  provide	  a	  system	  of	  warranties	  to	  track	  the	  rough	  
diamonds	  internally	  within	  states.	  	  
	  
	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  information	  disclosure	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
Kimberley	  Process.	  The	  most	  obvious	  is	  the	  certification	  system	  itself,	  which	  provides	  both	  
information	  and	  assurance	  that	  rough	  diamonds	  do	  not	  come	  from	  conflict	  zones.	  	  The	  
industry	  provides	  a	  chain	  of	  custody	  assurance	  through	  its	  warranties.	  	  In	  addition,	  
member	  states	  are	  required	  to	  supply	  information	  on	  diamond	  production	  levels,	  trade	  
data,	  and	  implementation	  problems	  they	  encounter.	  The	  KPCS	  also	  includes	  a	  system	  of	  
peer	  review	  to	  monitor	  the	  behavior	  of	  member	  states.	  Countries	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  
Kimberley	  standards	  can	  have	  their	  membership	  revoked.	  Since	  member	  states	  cannot	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trade	  with	  non-­‐member	  states,	  exclusion	  from	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  carries	  significant	  
costs.	  	  
	  	  
The	  Kimberley	  Process	  is	  currently	  facing	  a	  challenge	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
overcome:	  the	  outcry	  over	  Zimbabwe.	  	  In	  2006,	  the	  government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  took	  over	  the	  
Marange	  diamond	  region—potentially	  one	  of	  the	  richest	  sources	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  has	  
controlled	  the	  region	  through	  violence	  and	  repression,	  leading	  to	  calls	  that	  Zimbabwe’s	  
membership	  in	  the	  KPCS	  be	  revoked.	  However,	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process,	  
conflict	  diamonds	  come	  from	  rebel	  held	  or	  contested	  territory	  and	  not	  from	  violence	  by	  
government.	  The	  Kimberley	  Process	  members	  are	  divided	  on	  whether	  to	  certify	  Marange	  
diamonds.	  Some	  industry	  players	  refuse	  to	  buy	  from	  Zimbabwe,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  NGO	  
observers—Global	  Witness,	  a	  founding	  participant—recently	  walked	  away	  from	  the	  KPCS.	  
African	  states,	  including	  South	  Africa,	  argue	  that	  Zimbabwe	  has	  met	  the	  conditions	  of	  
membership,	  while	  the	  US,	  Canada,	  and	  Australia	  condemn	  the	  country.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  
KPCS	  is	  saying	  Zimbabwe	  can	  sell	  diamonds,	  but	  the	  issue	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  
scheme	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
The	  Kimberley	  Process	  is	  a	  transnational	  business	  governance	  initiative,	  although	  
one	  with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  state	  participation	  than	  most.	  The	  members	  are	  states,	  but	  
significant	  responsibilities	  are	  delegated	  to	  industry	  and	  NGO	  participants.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  
system	  is	  to	  regulate	  trade	  among	  member	  states,	  and	  internally	  regulate	  the	  supply	  chain	  
for	  diamonds.	  The	  idea	  of	  targeting	  diamonds	  to	  address	  conflict	  came	  from	  the	  earlier	  
experience	  with	  sanctions.	  The	  idea	  of	  certification	  may	  have	  come	  from	  earlier	  
experiences	  with	  it	  in	  the	  environmental	  and	  labor	  arenas,	  with	  the	  Forest	  Stewardship	  
Council	  and	  Fair	  Labor	  Association	  as	  potential	  models.(Bartley	  2010)	  
	  
The	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  
	  
At	  the	  World	  Summit	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  in	  Johannesburg	  in	  September	  
2002,	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	  first	  proposed	  the	  Extractive	  Industries	  
Transparency	  Initiative	  (EITI).	  He	  declared	  that	  governments	  and	  companies	  need	  to	  be	  
more	  open	  about	  the	  payments	  companies	  make	  to	  governments	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  
natural	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  equitable,	  sustainable	  development.	  	  The	  EITI	  aims	  to	  
reduce	  corruption	  through	  public	  reporting,	  and	  empower	  citizens	  through	  the	  process.	  
Although	  initiated	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  UK	  government,	  Blair	  intended	  from	  the	  
beginning	  for	  the	  EITI	  to	  be	  adopted	  widely,	  and	  to	  evolve	  into	  a	  multilateral	  program.	  The	  
EITI	  was	  conceived	  from	  the	  first	  as	  a	  platform	  to	  involve	  many	  different	  groups,	  including	  
governments,	  international	  organizations,	  NGOs	  and	  business,	  in	  a	  multi-­‐sectoral	  
partnership.	  States	  are	  members,	  but	  the	  EITI	  requires	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  consultation	  
within	  states	  over	  implementation.	  	  
	  
In	  June	  2003,	  representatives	  from	  31	  countries	  and	  17	  oil	  and	  mining	  firms	  broadly	  
endorsed	  the	  EITI.	  From	  2002-­‐2006,	  the	  EITI	  struggled	  to	  expand	  membership	  and	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institutionalize	  its	  processes,	  including	  a	  formal	  Validation	  Process	  for	  membership.	  Under	  
the	  EITI,	  companies	  must	  publish	  what	  they	  pay	  to	  governments,	  governments	  must	  
publish	  what	  they	  receive,	  and	  the	  two	  accounts	  must	  be	  audited	  and	  reconciled.	  Each	  
member	  state	  has	  their	  own	  national	  EITI	  to	  oversee	  the	  changes	  in	  law	  and	  regulation	  
necessary	  to	  implement	  the	  EITI	  requirements.	  	  
	  
The	  EITI	  now	  has	  a	  Secretariat	  based	  in	  Oslo,	  a	  Board	  and	  President	  and	  member	  
conferences	  every	  two	  years.	  The	  membership	  and	  validation	  processes	  have	  become	  more	  
detailed	  and	  comprehensive	  over	  time,	  with	  rigorous	  requirements	  for	  reporting,	  auditing,	  
and	  reconciling	  accounts.	  Azerbaijan	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  to	  join	  the	  EITI,	  and	  the	  
first	  to	  achieve	  compliant	  status.	  Today	  thirteen	  states	  are	  compliant,	  including	  Ghana,	  
Liberia,	  Nigeria	  and	  Norway,	  and	  twenty	  others	  have	  declared	  their	  candidacy.	  Many	  of	  
these	  countries	  joined	  or	  attained	  compliant	  status	  only	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  	  
	  
Initially,	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  extractive	  companies	  supported	  the	  EITI	  publicly.	  
But	  today,	  over	  forty	  large	  oil,	  gas	  and	  mining	  companies	  have	  declared	  their	  support	  and	  
work	  with	  national	  EITI	  groups.	  Three	  major	  industry	  associations	  have	  also	  declared	  their	  
support	  for	  the	  EITI:	  the	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute,	  the	  International	  Organization	  of	  
Oil	  and	  Gas	  Producers,	  and	  the	  International	  Council	  on	  Mining	  and	  Metals.	  In	  addition,	  a	  
group	  of	  financial	  firms	  has	  stated	  their	  formal	  support	  for	  the	  program.	  About	  a	  dozen	  
NGOs	  work	  with	  the	  EITI	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  while	  many	  civil	  society	  groups	  work	  
with	  it	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  
	  
Information	  disclosure	  is	  central	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  EITI.	  It	  is	  a	  transnational	  
business	  governance	  initiative	  in	  which	  member	  governments	  have	  a	  central	  role,	  but	  
industry	  is	  a	  key	  partner	  and	  critical	  to	  its	  success.	  Unlike	  the	  KPCS,	  this	  initiative	  is	  
entirely	  focused	  on	  internal	  transactions	  between	  business	  and	  government.	  Initially	  it	  
addressed	  the	  problems	  of	  petroleum	  development,	  not	  minerals,	  and	  industry	  was	  not	  
initially	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  the	  regime.	  The	  EITI	  was	  launched	  around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  
the	  Kimberley	  Process	  was	  implemented.	  Some	  of	  the	  same	  people	  involved	  in	  the	  
Kimberley	  Process,	  especially	  the	  activist	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Global	  Witness,	  supported	  the	  EITI	  
process.	  The	  two	  processes	  operated	  independently	  of	  each	  other,	  in	  different	  markets,	  but	  
have	  the	  potential	  to	  overlap	  as	  the	  EITI	  begins	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  mining	  and	  
minerals.	  
	  
Supply	  Chain	  Management	  and	  Due	  Diligence:	  OECD,	  US	  Dodd-­‐Frank,	  and	  GeSI	  
	  
As	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  teetered,	  and	  the	  EITI	  expanded,	  the	  next	  stage	  in	  
addressing	  the	  conflict	  and	  corruption	  linked	  to	  natural	  resource	  wealth	  focused	  on	  the	  
oversight	  of	  supply	  chains	  linking	  end	  users	  to	  the	  raw	  materials.	  New	  NGOs	  such	  as	  the	  
Enough	  and	  Resolve	  kept	  attention	  on	  the	  role	  of	  minerals	  in	  ongoing	  bloodshed,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  and	  its	  neighbors.	  Out	  of	  this	  grew	  a	  
range	  of	  initiatives	  to	  establish	  standards	  of	  “due	  diligence”	  and	  “responsible	  sourcing.”	  
The	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  have	  been	  the	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  Guidance	  for	  Responsible	  
Supply	  Chains	  of	  Minerals	  from	  Conflict-­‐Affected	  and	  High-­‐Risk	  Areas	  (hereafter	  the	  OECD	  
Due	  Diligence	  Guidance),	  the	  US	  Section	  1502	  provisions	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  financial	  sector	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reforms,	  and	  the	  GeSI	  initiatives	  on	  mineral	  smelters	  and	  supply	  chain	  tracing.	  The	  
European	  Union	  is	  considering	  provisions	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  UN	  has	  been	  
promoting	  due	  diligence	  in	  high-­‐level	  reports	  for	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  Of	  the	  three	  discussed	  
here,	  one	  is	  a	  traditional	  OECD	  standard-­‐setting	  exercise,	  one	  is	  a	  purely	  unilateral	  move	  by	  
the	  US,	  and	  one	  is	  an	  industry	  alliance.	  These	  three	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  the	  
pre-­‐existing	  governance	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  extractive	  sector.	  	  
	  
Around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  was	  established,	  many	  activists	  
were	  pressing	  companies	  to	  reveal	  more	  about	  the	  sources	  of	  their	  minerals.	  They	  
particularly	  targeted	  the	  electronics	  industry	  and	  minerals	  such	  as	  col-­‐tan	  and	  gold.	  In	  
2004,	  the	  electronics	  industry	  formed	  the	  Electronic	  Industry	  Citizenship	  Coalition	  to	  put	  
forth	  a	  general	  code	  of	  conduct	  to	  promote	  corporate	  social	  responsibility.	  It	  worked	  with	  
the	  Global	  eSustainability	  Initiative	  (GeSI)—a	  partnership	  between	  industry	  and	  NGOs—to	  
study	  the	  feasibility	  of	  supply	  chain	  transparency	  with	  regard	  to	  tantalum	  sourcing,	  later	  
adding	  gold,	  tin	  and	  tungsten.	  In	  2009,	  it	  issued	  a	  report	  that	  concluding	  that	  supply	  chain	  
transparency	  is	  feasible,	  	  although	  not	  with	  100%	  certainty	  about	  sources.	  (Resolve	  2010)	  
The	  GeSI	  launched	  the	  Conflict-­‐Free	  Smelter	  (CFS)	  program	  in	  2009.	  The	  CFS	  is	  a	  voluntary	  
audit	  program	  which	  verifies	  that	  a	  smelter	  does	  not	  obtain	  materials	  from	  the	  DRC	  region.	  
It	  covers	  tin,	  tantalum,	  tungsten	  and	  gold.	  	  Any	  smelters	  obtaining	  materials	  from	  the	  DRC	  
region	  must	  follow	  the	  OECD	  guidelines.	  The	  CFS	  also	  intends	  to	  be	  in	  conformance	  with	  
the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  provisions.	  	  
	  
The	  information	  provisions	  of	  the	  CFS	  entail	  auditing	  supply	  chains	  for	  the	  sources	  
of	  material	  obtained	  by	  the	  smelter.	  Unlike	  the	  KPCS	  and	  EITI,	  the	  main	  focus	  is	  a	  key	  node	  
in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  industry	  value	  chain—the	  smelters—instead	  of	  the	  miners	  or	  the	  end	  
users.	  	  Under	  the	  CFS,	  smelters	  ask	  to	  be	  audited,	  and	  if	  they	  successfully	  meet	  the	  
standards	  of	  the	  CFS	  they	  are	  listed	  as	  compliant.	  The	  EICC	  and	  GeSI	  maintain	  a	  website	  
with	  information	  on	  compliant	  smelters,	  currently	  only	  available	  for	  tantalum.	  They	  
recently	  developed	  a	  template	  for	  conflict	  minerals	  reporting.	  
	   In	  the	  US	  Congress,	  from	  2008	  on,	  various	  legislators	  proposed	  legislation	  
addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  DRC.	  As	  the	  Wall	  Street	  reform	  bill	  moved	  through	  
the	  US	  Congress	  in	  2010,	  they	  successfully	  pressed	  for	  transparency	  and	  due	  diligence	  
provisions	  on	  conflict	  minerals	  to	  be	  in	  the	  final	  document.	  Section	  1502	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  
reform	  bill	  imposes	  reporting	  requirements	  on	  companies	  listed	  on	  US	  stock	  markets	  that	  
use	  conflict	  minerals,	  establishing	  transparency	  and	  reporting	  requirements.	  Conflict	  
minerals	  are	  defined	  as	  gold,	  wolframite,	  cassiterite,	  coltan,	  and	  any	  other	  mineral	  
financing	  conflict	  in	  the	  DRC	  or	  neighboring	  states.	  If	  a	  company	  sources	  from	  the	  DRC	  
region,	  it	  must	  report	  to	  the	  SEC	  and	  publicly	  disclose	  information	  about	  due	  diligence—
including	  an	  audit,	  what	  conflict	  minerals	  it	  uses	  and	  from	  where,	  and	  any	  efforts	  to	  
identify	  the	  origin	  of	  minerals.	  This	  US	  initiative	  has	  potentially	  far-­‐reaching	  international	  
impact.	  It	  will	  apply	  to	  all	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  US	  stock	  exchange.	  Business	  groups	  such	  
as	  the	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  have	  blasted	  the	  reporting	  requirements,	  and	  many	  within	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the	  DRC	  express	  concern	  that	  this	  may	  lead	  companies	  to	  avoid	  the	  DRC	  altogether.	  Some	  
observers	  believe	  the	  SEC	  rules	  to	  implement	  Section	  1502	  are	  too	  draconian,	  and	  amount	  
to	  a	  trade	  embargo	  on	  the	  DRC.(Taylor	  2012)	  
	   The	  OECD	  has	  also	  taken	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  supply	  chain	  management	  and	  conflict	  
minerals.	  	  In	  fall	  of	  2010,	  it	  held	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  meeting	  to	  discuss	  conflict	  and	  
minerals	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  of	  Africa.	  It	  then	  proposed	  a	  set	  of	  voluntary	  guidelines	  
on	  supply	  chain	  management	  and	  reporting,	  which	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  OECD	  in	  December	  
and	  supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  African	  states.	  The	  Guidance	  encourages	  voluntary	  annual	  
reporting,	  and	  what	  it	  calls	  “risk	  management”	  through	  due	  diligence	  in	  supply	  chain	  
management	  for	  tin,	  tungsten,	  tantalum	  and	  gold.	  The	  OECD	  currently	  is	  working	  within	  
the	  DRC	  region	  on	  the	  ground,	  to	  help	  the	  minerals	  sector	  develop	  supply	  chain	  
management,	  due	  diligence,	  and	  reporting	  standards.	  The	  OECD	  is	  working	  with	  industry	  
to	  trial	  the	  Guidance	  on	  the	  ground.	  It	  is	  making	  an	  effort	  to	  apply	  the	  Guidance	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  supports	  artisanal	  miners	  without	  contributing	  to	  ongoing	  conflict.(OECD	  2010)	  	  
Variation	  across	  Initiatives	  	  
	  
	   All	  of	  these	  initiatives	  regulate	  business	  transnationally,	  and	  utilize	  some	  form	  of	  
information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  key	  mechanism	  of	  governance.	  They	  vary	  in	  significant	  ways—
the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  disclosure	  requirements,	  the	  transactions	  targeted	  by	  the	  initiative,	  
the	  industry	  affected,	  and	  most	  of	  all	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  industry	  contributes	  to	  
governance	  or	  is	  simply	  the	  object	  of	  regulatory	  action.	  (see	  Table	  1)	  
	  
	   The	  Kimberley	  Process	  is	  the	  only	  initiative	  that	  focuses	  explicitly	  on	  certification,	  
although	  the	  Conflict-­‐Free	  Smelter	  program	  is	  essentially	  certifying	  smelters	  by	  listing	  
them	  as	  compliant.	  The	  EITI,	  in	  contrast,	  relies	  on	  public	  reporting	  as	  the	  form	  of	  
information	  disclosure.	  The	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  standards	  lie	  somewhere	  in	  between.	  	  The	  
KPCS,	  CFS,	  and	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  are	  concerned	  with	  international	  trade,	  and	  monitoring	  
of	  the	  supply	  chain.	  The	  EITI	  is	  primarily	  focused	  on	  internal	  transactions	  within	  a	  country,	  
although	  some	  of	  the	  due	  diligence	  efforts	  by	  the	  OECD	  (along	  with	  other	  efforts,	  such	  as	  
the	  Diamond	  Development	  Initiative)	  attempt	  to	  improve	  internal	  domestic	  governance.	  
One	  of	  the	  striking	  differences	  is	  sectoral—diamonds,	  other	  minerals,	  and	  petroleum.	  The	  
diamond	  industry	  is	  highly	  organized	  in	  way	  that	  the	  other	  sectors	  are	  not.	  It	  has	  a	  unique	  
history	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  durable	  cartels	  that	  has	  ever	  existed	  in	  modern	  times,	  
characterized	  by	  strong	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  backed	  by	  common	  norms.	  (Spar	  2006)	  
Although	  the	  cartel	  was	  weakening,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  diamond	  sector	  facilitated	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process.	  Other	  mineral	  industries	  are	  more	  competitive	  and	  do	  
not	  have	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  history	  of	  tight	  control	  and	  social	  pressures	  as	  in	  the	  diamond	  
sector.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  
oligopoly	  among	  the	  oil	  majors,	  and	  is	  undergoing	  significant	  change	  with	  the	  globalization	  
of	  state-­‐owned	  firms	  from	  China	  and	  elsewhere.	  These	  differences	  explain	  why	  their	  was	  
rapid	  consensus	  in	  the	  diamond	  sector,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  rapid	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  
Process.	  The	  greater	  diversity	  and	  different	  interests	  in	  the	  other	  sectors	  would	  inhibit	  a	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   Another	  area	  of	  significant	  variation	  is	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  government	  involvement,	  as	  
a	  participant	  or	  a	  target.	  	  The	  major	  diamond	  producing	  states	  had	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  
addressing	  the	  conflict	  diamonds	  issue,	  and	  took	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  the	  Kimberley	  Process.	  
The	  KPCS	  was	  created	  as	  a	  two-­‐tier	  system	  in	  which	  states	  became	  members	  of	  an	  
intergovernmental	  organization,	  and	  industry	  provided	  the	  certification	  and	  chain	  of	  
custody	  system.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  home	  state	  of	  major	  oil	  and	  mining	  companies	  had	  a	  
particular	  interest	  in	  addressing	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  areas	  abroad	  where	  industry	  faced	  a	  
challenging	  environment.	  The	  EITI	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  meant	  to	  apply	  not	  to	  itself,	  
but	  to	  resource-­‐rich	  fragile	  states	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  Once	  launched,	  the	  target	  states	  
could	  sign	  up	  to	  become	  members	  after	  making	  fairly	  profound	  changes	  to	  their	  own	  
governance	  system.	  This	  included	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  national	  EITI	  
implementation	  group,	  reporting	  on	  industry	  and	  government	  financial	  transactions,	  and	  
the	  auditing	  and	  reconciliation	  of	  accounts.	  The	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  obviously	  involved	  the	  
OECD	  governments,	  but	  it	  is	  industry	  that	  voluntarily	  adopts	  the	  guidelines	  to	  apply	  to	  
their	  supply	  chains.	  The	  US	  Section	  1502	  provisions	  are	  traditional	  government	  regulation	  
in	  some	  ways,	  but	  apply	  to	  all	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  US	  stock	  exchange	  and	  directly	  affect	  
all	  companies	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  of	  these	  companies.	  The	  CFS	  is	  an	  industry	  initiative,	  
developed	  in	  partnership	  with	  NGOs,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  government	  participation.	  
Overall,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  require	  domestic	  change	  varies,	  as	  does	  the	  level	  of	  
participation	  by	  industry.	  	  The	  variation	  in	  government	  participation	  and	  their	  different	  
interests	  as	  home	  states	  and	  hosts,	  targets	  of	  the	  initiative	  or	  not,	  influenced	  the	  
institutional	  differences.	  
 
VI.	  Interactions	  among	  Governance	  Initiatives	  
 
This	  brief	  overview	  of	  different	  governance	  initiatives	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  
information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  commonality	  among	  them,	  despite	  institutional	  variation.	  	  We	  
see	  a	  convergence	  in	  the	  nexus	  between	  conflict	  and	  corruption,	  as	  attention	  shifted	  from	  
states	  to	  business	  in	  response	  to	  repeated	  failures	  of	  sanctions	  and	  other	  means	  to	  address	  
these	  issues.	  	  Sometime	  around	  the	  year	  2000	  there	  was	  as	  tipping	  point	  as	  more	  and	  more	  
anti-­‐corporate	  campaigns	  began	  looking	  to	  business	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  intractable	  problems.	  
Both	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  conflict	  campaigns	  looked	  to	  business	  as	  a	  source	  of	  the	  
problem,	  and	  a	  potential	  partner	  in	  solving	  it.	  This	  began	  a	  process	  of	  convergence	  that	  
created	  a	  common	  organizational	  field,	  populated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  different	  governance	  
programs.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  global	  normative	  convergence	  focuses	  on	  
rationalization	  and	  bureaucratization	  as	  key	  features	  of	  contemporary	  global	  society	  
(DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  1983;	  Barnett	  and	  Finnemore	  2004),	  here	  I	  focus	  on	  information	  
disclosure	  by	  both	  business	  and	  governments—making	  information	  about	  the	  activities	  
and	  operations	  visible	  through	  self-­‐reporting.	  (Florini	  1998;	  Gupta	  2010)	  Gupta	  has	  called	  
this	  part	  of	  a	  “procedural	  turn”	  in	  politics,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  to	  establish	  processes	  
in	  the	  hope	  they	  will	  lead	  to	  desired	  outcomes.(Gupta	  2010)	  We	  see	  this	  occurring	  across	  a	  
range	  of	  areas—calls	  for	  transparency	  in	  foreign	  aid,	  philanthropy,	  civil	  society	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organization	  funding,	  etc.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  argue,	  this	  normative	  convergence	  has	  been	  
accompanied	  by	  institutional	  divergence.	  
	  
Much	  of	  the	  development	  of	  and	  difference	  in	  each	  of	  these	  initiatives	  can	  be	  traced	  
to	  the	  failures	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  earlier	  efforts.	  This	  is	  a	  case	  of	  path	  dependence	  with	  
experimentation:	  earlier	  initiatives	  established	  certification	  and	  transparency	  models,	  and	  
later	  ones	  selectively	  took	  up	  some	  features	  and	  not	  others.	  The	  Kimberley	  Process	  clearly	  
came	  about	  due	  to	  the	  obvious	  failures	  of	  sanctions	  to	  bring	  about	  peace.	  The	  EITI	  was	  
created	  as	  a	  transnational	  initiative	  to	  address	  clear	  government	  failures	  in	  resource-­‐rich	  
developing	  states.	  Once	  in	  place,	  the	  two	  together	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  complementary	  set	  
of	  standards	  for	  the	  management	  of	  natural	  resources.	  But	  each	  had	  weaknesses.	  The	  KPCS	  
is	  credited	  with	  helping	  bring	  rebels	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  expanding	  
the	  amount	  of	  “legitimate”	  diamonds	  in	  trade,	  it	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  deal	  with	  violence	  by	  
governments,	  and	  the	  situation	  in	  Zimbabwe	  is	  undermining	  the	  entire	  process.	  The	  EITI	  
has	  been	  a	  spur	  to	  establish	  better	  governance	  among	  states	  that	  sign	  on—but	  not	  all	  states	  
have	  joined,	  and	  it	  has	  not	  been	  designed	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  profound	  violence	  and	  
breakdown	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo.	  The	  result	  has	  been	  a	  spate	  of	  
initiatives	  at	  the	  international,	  national,	  and	  industry	  levels	  designed	  to	  trace	  and	  track	  
minerals	  and	  ensure	  they	  do	  not	  come	  from	  the	  DRC	  region.	  These	  clearly	  reference	  each	  
other,	  and	  reference	  the	  KPCS	  and	  EITI.	  	  
	  
The	  identity	  of	  major	  actors	  varied	  across	  these	  initiatives.	  We	  can	  look	  at	  power	  
among	  states,	  and	  power	  within	  industry	  sectors.	  The	  diamond	  industry	  had	  a	  major	  player	  
in	  DeBeers,	  with	  sufficient	  market	  power	  to	  greatly	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  rough	  
diamonds	  debate.	  In	  addition,	  the	  major	  producer	  and	  consumer	  states—South	  Africa	  and	  
the	  US—both	  agreed	  on	  the	  need	  for	  a	  certification	  system,	  and	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  UN.	  
Both	  the	  EITI	  and	  the	  US	  systems	  clearly	  relied	  on	  one	  powerful	  actor	  to	  initiate	  them,	  but	  
with	  different	  interests.	  The	  UK	  wanted	  an	  international	  regime	  based	  on	  transparency,	  
while	  the	  US	  wanted	  a	  domestic	  regime	  with	  transnational	  reach.	  The	  extractive	  industry	  
itself	  had	  diverse	  interests,	  with	  no	  one	  arguing	  for	  certification	  but	  increasing	  concern	  for	  
supply	  chain	  transparency	  by	  the	  electronics	  industry.	  Recently,	  Apple	  voluntarily	  
published	  information	  on	  its	  supply	  chain—not	  due	  to	  the	  Section	  1502	  requirements	  but	  
as	  a	  commitment	  to	  address	  the	  conflict	  minerals	  issue.(Apple	  2012)	  It	  is	  working	  with	  the	  
GeSI	  and	  the	  OECD	  Due	  Diligence	  Guidance.	  	  
	  
There	  have	  been	  numerous	  calls	  for	  certification	  by	  activists	  concerned	  about	  
conflict	  minerals.	  The	  Enough	  campaign	  is	  pressing	  Apple,	  as	  an	  industry	  leader,	  to	  develop	  
a	  certification	  system.	  The	  electronics	  industry,	  however,	  is	  not	  so	  oligopolistic	  and	  the	  
supply	  chains	  are	  complex,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  diamond	  industry.	  The	  diamond	  industry	  is	  
highly	  structured	  and	  close-­‐knit	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  do	  not	  see	  in	  other	  sectors.	  In	  addition,	  it	  
is	  much	  more	  affected	  by	  reputational	  threats	  than,	  say,	  oil	  or	  coltan.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  
signs	  that	  the	  Conflict-­‐Free	  Smelter	  program	  could	  gradually	  move	  from	  reporting	  to	  a	  
more	  stringent	  certification	  program.	  	  
	  
Today,	  natural	  resources	  are	  subject	  to	  increasing	  international	  regulation	  of	  
different	  types.	  	  These	  transnational	  business	  governance	  initiatives	  increasingly	  overlap,	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and	  the	  participants	  work	  within	  multiple	  initiatives	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Their	  common	  focus	  
on	  information	  disclosure	  as	  a	  governance	  mechanism	  reflects	  a	  larger	  shift	  towards	  
transparency	  across	  many	  issue	  areas.	  	  Public	  reporting	  and	  certification	  provide	  the	  
means	  to	  hold	  governments	  and	  industry	  accountable,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  democratic	  
processes.	  The	  development	  of	  this	  organizational	  field,	  or	  regime	  complex,	  raises	  further	  
questions.	  How	  effective	  are	  they?	  Will	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  from	  China	  and	  elsewhere	  
undermine	  them?	  How	  have	  networks	  among	  activists	  and	  policymakers	  facilitated	  the	  
creation	  of	  complementary	  governance	  initiatives?	  These	  questions	  will	  be	  particularly	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i The use of mineral resources to finance conflict and foster corruption is not new, but the category of 
“conflict minerals” has been socially constructed by activists as an international problem only in recent 
decades. 
ii All of these efforts have some element of information disclosure in how they work. Here, I compare 
only those where some form of information disclosure is the central governance mechanism, leaving 
out the Chad-Cameroon project and the Voluntary Principles. 
iii Burkhard Eberlein argues that the concept of regime complex emphasizes fragmentation, while 
organizational fields are about homogenization. (personal communication) Nevertheless, they both try 
to make sense of an area of common endeavor. 
iv The World Bank staff debated whether anti-corruption policies hindered development, and some 
were concerned that they would be trespassing into political affairs.  
v In 2006, Revenue Watch became an independent organization with a global mandate to promote 
effective governance of natural resources. 
vi The founding principles of the Global Compact contain three principles on labor, three on human 
rights, and three on the environment—plus the anti-corruption principle. 
 
